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INTRODUCTION 
As technological advances enable autonomous vehicles to 
merge onto public roadways, the effects of this change will be 
felt throughout daily lives, with great adaptations required in 
many aspects of society. Creating vehicles capable of driving 
themselves is only the beginning of a process that includes 
significant changes to our road infrastructure, psychological 
acceptance necessary to allow a computer to chauffer humans 
on their grocery runs, and financial freedom to afford such a 
vehicle, coupled with marketing strategies to convince drivers 
to give up ownership of a private vehicle and laws that 
accommodate the technical and control changes that 
accompany autonomous vehicles. The impact vehicle 
automation will have on law enforcement and the 
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corresponding privacy rights of the users of automated vehicles 
is the piece of the puzzle addressed in the following discussion.1 
A potentially drastic reduction in law enforcement 
engagement with citizens is an often overlooked outcome of 
self-driving vehicles, as the focus remains steadily on highway 
safety and efficiency of traffic flow.2 Many of the safety benefits 
reaped as humans are taken out of the second-by-second 
decision-making equation of driving will also eliminate traffic 
violations; as vehicles become increasingly automated, the 
number of traffic violations will continually decrease.3 At the 
point where vehicles are driverless, it appears that the 
necessity of traffic-related stops could become moot altogether.4 
Between now and then, however, there will be questions raised 
every step of the way, with answers that are likely to change as 
quickly as the modifications in the technology. Criminal 
liability issues in particular will arise in two ways—a 
legislative need for the actual rules of the road to change and a 
judicial response regarding the enforcement of those laws. 
The majority of the answers sought depend on more 
detailed specifications of the technologies to be used, as well as 
infrastructure plans for self-contained and interconnected 
vehicles, but the areas to be impacted are easily identifiable. 
This Article will focus on the criminal liability aspects of 
automated vehicles, beginning with impacts on the traffic codes 
that are expected (and in some cases, have already begun). The 
heart of the discussion will be in the judicial response category, 
examining the privacy protections around the digital 
information created by the car itself. The conclusion will 
identify possible courses of action for both government entities 
and manufacturers of these vehicles as they establish the 
parameters in which the vehicles operate. 
                                                          
 1. Automated Vehicles have varying levels of automation, while 
autonomous vehicles are capable of driving themselves independently. 
Additionally, some self-driving vehicle concepts include vehicle-to-vehicle and 
vehicle-to-infrastructure communication. 
 2.  See Dorothy J. Glancy, Autonomous and Automated and Connected 
Cars—Oh My! First Generation Autonomous Cars in the Legal Ecosystem, 16 
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 619, 663 (2015) (“[J]ust over half of all citizen contacts 
with police occur in connection with traffic stops.”). 
 3. See Frank Douma & Sarah Aue Palodichuk, Criminal Liability Issues 
Created by Autonomous Vehicles, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1157, 1158 (2012). 
 4. Pursuit of criminals would still require traffic stops, but would not 
likely be considered a traffic-related stop. 
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I. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE: CHANGING THE TRAFFIC 
CODE 
Automated vehicles will eliminate traffic offenses, create 
traffic offenses, and change the implications of everything from 
who is driving to how violations are defined.5 Several states 
and the District of Columbia have begun authorizing 
autonomous vehicles legislatively,6 although experts argue that 
a lack of permission in other jurisdictions does not necessarily 
serve as a prohibition of their use.7 The first priority in 
establishing regulation of these vehicles is designating who is 
responsible for their operation. Operation of—or control of, in 
the legal sense—the vehicle is required by every state that 
expressly allows for the testing or use of an autonomous vehicle 
on public roads.8 In Nevada, this requirement for operation is 
met by a “human operator . . . [s]eated . . . [m]onitoring . . . [and 
c]apable of taking over immediate manual control of the 
autonomous vehicle in the event of a failure of the autonomous 
technology or other emergency.”9 Nevada also requires a 
specific “driver’s license endorsement for the operation of an 
autonomous vehicle,”10 while Florida specifies that anyone 
“who possesses a valid driver license may operate an 
autonomous vehicle in autonomous mode.”11 
That these legislative approaches require a human 
operator is likely a reflection of the tolerance of the general 
public’s comfort level. It is also the simplest transition 
available to lawmakers who face the task of navigating a 
complicated road of strict liability traffic violations, settled 
                                                          
 5. Gabriel Weiner & Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Driving: 
Legislative & Regulatory Action, CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y, 
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/wiki/index.php/Automated_Driving:_Legisla
tive_and_Regulatory_Action (last modified Feb. 3, 2015) (providing a current 
fifty-state survey of statutes that were adopted or changed in order to address 
increases in autonomous vehicles). 
 6. See id. 
 7. Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Vehicles Are Probably Legal in the 
United States, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 411, 413 (2014). 
 8. See Weiner & Smith, supra note 5; infra notes 9–11 and 
accompanying text. 
 9. NEV. REV. STAT. § 482A.070(1)–(3) (2013); see also CAL. VEH. CODE § 
38750(b)(2) (West 2015). 
 10. NEV. REV. STAT. § 482A.200 (2013). 
 11. FLA. STAT. § 316.85(1) (2014). 
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court precedents, and looming public safety concerns.12 If there 
is an operator responsible for the behavior of the vehicle, then 
speeding is still speeding, drunk driving will continue to result 
in a DWI, and negligence can be met as an intent requirement 
in a fatal accident. Interestingly, some states that demand an 
operator pay attention to the vehicle on autopilot have 
exempted those very operators from bans on texting and use of 
handheld wireless communications devices.13 
If the autopilot of airplanes is of any use in predicting 
effects of the automation of vehicles, the biggest problem with 
holding drivers responsible as operators, even though they are 
not operating cars in a meaningful way, is complacency. 
Human error, whether through boredom or simply not paying 
attention, “remains the leading cause of aviation accidents” as 
automation has increased.14 Another significant difficulty with 
holding drivers accountable as operators is the potential 
benefits lost from a policy standpoint without a “designated 
driver” option, including the possibility of being used as a late-
night ride home for an intoxicated person,15 a shuttle for an 
elderly person who no longer can pass a driving test, or a taxi 
for someone not yet old enough to take the wheel himself.16 
Drivers of the next generation must be considers as well; 
eventually there will be people whose driving experience is 
limited to self-driving vehicles. It is likely that handing control 
over to an inexperienced operator in the case of an emergency 
would yield a worse result than having the car make decisions 
for itself. 
A challenge to this operator-as-babysitter approach is 
already on the horizon, as Google has announced that its 
                                                          
 12. See Douma & Palodichuk, supra note 3, at 1162 (discussing how new 
laws regulating autonomous vehicles might “var[y] significantly from 
traditional laws that consider the operator of a motor vehicle to be actively 
controlling the vehicle.”). 
 13. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 316.305(3)(b)(7) (2014); NEV. REV. STAT. § 
484B.165(7) (2013). 
 14. Maria Konnikova, The Hazards of Going on Autopilot, NEW YORKER 
(Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/science/maria-konnikova/hazards-a
utomation (introducing the article with a narrative about a flight crew 
engaged in a distracting conversation during landing which caused an 
unnecessary stall and killed everyone on board). 
 15. Formerly known as the “Take me home, I’m drunk” button. Douma & 
Palodichuk, supra note 3, at 1158. 
 16. Id. 
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driverless cars will be ready for deployment in two to five 
years.17 These cars have no steering wheel and no pedals18 
(although for test purposes manual controls are present 
because they are required under California law19). Whether 
California will choose to amend its regulations to allow for 
Google’s design is yet to be seen, but Google “hope[s to] see you 
on the streets of Northern California” in 2015.20 
Switching gears to actual traffic violations, it does not take 
much of an imagination to see how some offenses could easily 
be eliminated over time and how the creation others will be 
absolutely necessary in order for the technology to progress. 
Expired registration tags and the proof of insurance 
requirement could become things of the past if autonomous 
vehicles require codes confirming the car is up-to-date 
administratively to function. Further, some prominent new 
offenses will likely address handovers from autopilot to human 
operator,21 situations where autonomous vehicles are 
prohibited,22 and the consequences for hacking into a vehicle’s 
driving technology.23 
There is also a category of pre-existing laws that will need 
modification to accommodate autonomous vehicles, some of 
which should already be revised considering the number of 
vehicles on the road already that possess low-level automated 
capabilities.24 These low-level automations include driver 
assistance such as adaptive cruise control and partial 
automation features like lane assist.25 Even when working 
properly, it is possible for adaptive cruise control to 
                                                          
 17. The Associated Press, Google Expects Public in Driverless Cars in 2 to 
5 Years, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2015, 5:34 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/ap
online/2015/01/14/business/ap-us-google-driverless-car.html. 
 18. Id. 
 19. CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750(c)(1)(D) (West 2015). 
 20. Google Self-Driving Car Project, GOOGLE PLUS (Dec. 22, 2014) 
https://plus.google.com/+GoogleSelfDrivingCars/posts/9WBWP2E4GDu. 
 21. See Douma & Palodichuk, supra note 3, at 1162–64 (discussing new 
regulations for autonomous vehicles). 
 22. See generally id. (discussing scenarios where the driver would be 
required to take control of an autonomous vehicle). 
 23. Id. at 1159, 1164–68. 
 24. JAMES M. ANDERSON ET AL., RAND CORP., AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE 
TECHNOLOGY: A GUIDE FOR POLICYMAKERS 2 (2014), available at 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR443-1
/RAND_RR443-1.pdf. 
 25. Id. 
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“misbehave” under the written rules of the road.26 For example, 
if a car is gauging speed based on the vehicle in front of it in a 
thirty-five mile per hour zone, what happens as the two 
vehicles pass into a fifty-five mile per hour zone? The second 
car will likely be speeding at some point. Following too closely 
is another citable activity that becomes routine for cars 
traveling together with adaptive cruise control.27 Lane assist 
features present their own problems that range from switching 
lanes inappropriately to creating unnecessary traffic stops 
because of weaving.28 Along with technical issues, it will also be 
important for the new traffic code to clarify the standards for 
automated operators if they are different from those expected 
of human operators. The question has been raised whether 
standards “merely require an automated vehicle to perform as 
well as a reasonable human driver—or will governments, 
courts, and consumers expect something more?”29 
Other states are looking at the legislative prototypes as 
they are adopted, with many proposals sitting in committee.30 
Legislators, as well as proponents of the technological 
advances, are looking to the federal government for nationwide 
guidelines, but the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA) is hesitant to recommend rules for 
consumer use.31 NHTSA’s reserved involvement has frustrated 
                                                          
 26. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., ROAD SAFETY: IMPACT OF 
NEW TECHNOLOGIES 77 (2003). 
 27. Id. (“Abuse of new technologies is also a serious threat. As an example 
if adaptive cruise control results in drivers following each other too closely, 
then risk might actually increase.”). 
 28. Chad Kirchner, Lane Keeping Assist Explained, MOTOR REV. (Feb. 17, 
2014), http://motorreview.com/lane-keeping-assist-explained/ (discussing the 
strengths as well as the weaknesses of new lane keeping assist technologies). 
 29. Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Vehicles Are Probably Legal in the 
United States, CENTER FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (Apr. 15, 2013, 11:58 AM), 
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2013/04/automated-vehicles-are-probably-le
gal-united-states. Smith also asks, “how and to whom will laws that prescribe 
‘reasonable,’ ‘prudent,’ ‘practicable,’ and ‘safe’ driving apply?” Id. 
 30. See Weiner & Smith, supra note 5 (presenting a breakdown of the 
progress various states have made in terms of autonomous vehicle legislation). 
 31. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF POLICY CONCERNING AUTOMATED VEHICLES 10 
(2013), available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/rulemaking/pdf
/Automated_Vehicles_Policy.pdf (“NHTSA has considerable concerns . . . about 
detailed state regulation on safety of self-driving vehicles, and does not 
recommend at this time that states permit operation of self-driving vehicles 
for purposes other than testing.”). 
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the process for some, as Florida’s Autonomous Vehicle Report 
points out, “[w]hile NHTSA recommends establishing reporting 
requirements to monitor the performance of self-driving 
technology during testing, Department staff does not have the 
expertise to interpret or apply the results. This is a function 
normally provided by the federal government (NHTSA).”32 It 
appears, unsurprisingly, that it is difficult to create legislation 
around a technology that doesn’t yet exist.33 On the other hand, 
it is possible that government intervention could stifle progress 
and limit the development of this technology by addressing 
only that which is reasonably anticipated at the moment rather 
than looking to potential uses ten or twenty years down the 
road. 
II. JUDICIAL RESPONSE: IS IT A PHONE, IS IT A CAR . . . 
IT’S A MINICOMPUTER! 
The only place a conversation on the Fourth Amendment 
and transportation technologies can start is with the creation of 
data. The bottom line is that once data exists, it is accessible 
for prosecutorial use.34 The strength of the restrictions on its 
use through the courts, specific legislation aimed at protecting 
the data of users of smart vehicles, and the architects who 
make the final calls on privacy and security decisions in 
automated vehicles each play important roles in setting 
expectations—not just for criminals, but all consumers—in the 
new era of smartphones, minicomputers, and self-driving 
vehicles. 
If the discussion on legislating autonomous vehicles 
created uncertainty around the development of applicable 
traffic codes, the privacy protections surrounding data found 
within those vehicles are equally difficult to predict considering 
                                                          
 32. JULIE L. JONES, FLA. HIGHWAY SAFETY & MOTOR VEHICLES, 
AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE REPORT 5 (2014), available at http://www.flhsmv.gov
/html/HSMVAutonomousVehicleReport2014.pdf. 
 33. See Alex Davies, Self-Driving Cars Are Legal, but Real Rules Would 
Be Nice, WIRED (May 15, 2015, 7:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/2015/05/self-
driving-cars-legal-real-rules-nice/ (“The tech is new, complicated, and being 
developed in different ways by different companies, so just understanding how 
it works is difficult, let alone knowing how to make it work safely.”). 
 34. See Douma & Palodichuk, supra note 3, at 1167–68; Dorothy J. 
Glancy, Privacy in Autonomous Vehicles, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1171, 1196, 
1216 (2012). 
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the absence of examples to study at this point in time.35 This 
creates difficulties because there are a wide variety of 
prototypes utilizing various levels of automation, some sharing 
similar technology, but all having unique attributes.36 It is 
hard to determine the level of privacy protection expected when 
one cannot even determine exactly what is being protected.37 
Automated vehicles will potentially contain a wealth of 
digital information previously unavailable to law enforcement 
officers, including personally identifiable information, route 
history and planning, and a log of the car’s actions.38 The 
protections afforded through the Fourth Amendment will be 
vital in making the public feel comfortable using these vehicles 
without having a chilling effect on their actions. The mobile 
nature of the car lends itself to creating locational privacy 
problems, but the Supreme Court has not yet tackled the issue. 
In 2012, warrantless GPS tracking came before the Court in 
United States v. Jones, but was decided in a narrow ruling on 
trespass.39 While the Jones ruling that did not lay out 
expectations that can be relied upon for future vehicle-related 
privacy cases, Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence pieced together 
the Mosaic theory to address the locational privacy issue 
presented.40 It is more common to see location-based cases 
arising out of historical and real time cell site location 
information cases, in which people are tracked by their cell 
phone signals. None of these cases have reached the Supreme 
Court however, and the lower courts are split significantly.41 
The best insight into whether information stored in an 
automated vehicle will be accessible by a warrantless search 
also comes in the context of cell phones. Riley v. California 
                                                          
 35. Glancy, supra note 34, at 1216–17 (“Because autonomous vehicles are 
not yet available for general use, predictions about privacy expectations 
regarding autonomous vehicles necessarily have to be extrapolated from 
experience with other types of vehicles, transportation issues, and intelligent 
systems.”). 
 36. Id. at 1172–73. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 1186. 
 39. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949–53 (2012). 
 40. Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 41. E.g., United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding 
no warrant was needed to access location data from a cell service provider), 
aff’d in relevant part, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015); Tracey v. State, 152 So. 
3d 504 (Fla. 2014) (holding that accessing real time cell site location 
information required a warrant). 
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addresses digital data head on for the first time and does so in 
way that is meaningful beyond the facts in either of the cases 
at hand.42 
III. RILEY FACTS 
Riley was pulled over for driving with expired registration 
tags, and the traffic stop resulted in his car being impounded 
because his license had been suspended.43 An inventory search 
of his car revealed two handguns under the hood, resulting in 
Riley’s arrest for possession of concealed and loaded firearms.44 
When searching Riley, an officer seized his smartphone and 
noticed what he presumed to be the gang abbreviation “CK” 
next to names in the phone.45 Later, another detective went 
through Riley’s phone looking for more gang-related evidence, 
during which photos of Riley in front of a car allegedly used in 
a shooting were discovered.46 Riley was charged with (and 
eventually convicted of) firing at an occupied vehicle, assault 
with a semiautomatic firearm, and attempted murder.47 His 
sentence of fifteen years to life in prison carried an 
enhancement due to committing those crimes for the benefit of 
a criminal street gang.48 
Wurie was arrested after being observed making a drug 
sale.49 Two of his cell phones were seized, including a flip 
phone.50 A police officer pressed one button to access the call 
log and another to determine the phone number associated 
with the “my house” label shown on the external screen.51 The 
number was traced to an apartment building where they saw 
Wurie’s name on the mailbox and a woman resembling the 
                                                          
 42. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). The Riley decision deals 
with two sets of facts. The first set of facts concerned Riley, who was arrested 
as a result of a traffic stop for driving with expired registration tags. Id. at 
2480. The second set of facts dealt with Wurie, who was arrested after his 
involvement in an apparent drug deal. Id. at 2481. 
 43. Id. at 2480. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 2480–81. 
 47. Id. at 2481. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
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photo on his phone through a window.52 The building was 
secured while they got a warrant, after which 215 grams of 
crack cocaine, marijuana, drug paraphernalia, a firearm and 
ammunition, and cash were found in Wurie’s apartment.53 
Convictions stemming from this search led to a prison sentence 
of 262 months.54 
IV. RILEY FINDINGS: THE DIGITAL FRONTIER 
The decision in Riley heralds the Supreme Court’s arrival 
in the “digital age,” a time in which the majority of people 
“carry a cache of sensitive personal information” as they go 
about their days.55 The Court held that a warrant is generally 
required when searching digital information on a cell phone 
seized during a lawful arrest.56 In Riley, the information was 
contained in a cell phone, but the Court made clear that the 
protection is around digital data, describing both flip phones 
and smartphones as “minicomputers that also happen to have 
the capacity to be used as a telephone.”57 
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures of one’s “persons, houses, papers, and 
effects,” generally requiring a warrant showing probable cause 
to justify such a search.58 Exceptions to the warrant 
requirement are described in Wyoming v. Houghton as a 
balancing act between the furthering of government interests 
and the extent of an intrusion on an individual’s privacy.59 The 
Court refers to three cases—Chimel, Robinson, and Gant—for 
the context of the search incident to arrest (SITA) exception to 
the warrant requirement.60 Chimel provides the groundwork 
for the SITA doctrine in the form of two prongs that examine 
                                                          
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 2482. 
 55. Id. at 2490. 
 56. Id. at 2493. 
 57. Id. at 2489. 
 58. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 59. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299 (1999) (“[W]e must evaluate 
the search or seizure under traditional standards of reasonableness by 
assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an 
individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the 
promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”). 
 60. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009); United States v. 
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
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the government interests of officer safety and preservation of 
evidence.61 In Robinson, the Court broadly found the Chimel 
prongs to be satisfied in all searches incident to lawful arrest, 
rejecting a case-by-case determination of whether a weapon or 
evidence was likely to be found.62 The pocket searching in 
Robinson was not seen as a greater intrusion of privacy beyond 
the arrest itself.63 A third case applies specifically to the search 
of an arrestee’s vehicle.64 Gant extended the SITA exception 
when it is “reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime 
of arrest might be found in the vehicle.”65 
In Riley, the Court held that neither prong of government 
interest in Chimel was furthered when applied to the digital 
contents of cell phones.66 As far as officer safety is concerned, 
while the physical phone could be examined for potential use as 
a weapon, the data inside cannot cause harm to the officer.67 
Warning an officer of impending backup called for by the 
arrestee was also raised as a potential safety issue and 
concerns about the destruction of evidence through remote 
wiping of data or data encryption were considered,68 but the 
Court noted those situations can be better addressed through a 
case-specific exception like the one for exigent circumstances.69 
Although there was very little to be found in terms of 
legitimate government interests at stake, the digital distinction 
lies on the other side of the Wyoming v. Houghton balancing 
                                                          
 61. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762–63 (“When an arrest is made, it is reasonable 
for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any 
weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his 
escape . . . . In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to 
search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent 
its concealment or destruction.”). 
 62. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Gant, 556 U.S. at 332. 
 65. Gant, 556 U.S. at 343. 
 66. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2478 (2014) (“But a search of 
digital information on a cell phone does not further the government interests 
identified in Chimel, and implicates substantially greater individual privacy 
interests than a brief physical search.”). 
 67. Id. at 2485. 
 68. Id. at 2485–86 (suggesting two solutions for the prevention of remote 
wiping or encryption: (1) remove the phone’s battery, or (2) use Faraday bags 
to isolate the phone from radio waves). 
 69. Id. at 2494 (providing reassurance that “extreme hypotheticals” can be 
addressed through the exigent circumstance exception). 
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test. The Court did not extend Robinson to permit searches of 
data stored on cell phones because of the vast difference 
between a search of physical objects and digital content; 
searching pockets is not that much more intrusive than the 
actual arrest itself, but it is considerably different than 
searching digital data.70 Instead, Riley classifies a cell phone 
search as a substantial intrusion because of both the 
quantitative and qualitative differences between digital data 
and physical objects.71 Not only can a phone store many 
distinct types of information, it can hold an immense quantity 
of just one type information72—a phone fits in a pocket, but can 
hold more than a house.73 The information held in cell phones 
often touches on every aspect of people’s lives: Internet 
browsing history, location data to reconstruct movements, and 
apps for everything from tracking pregnancy symptoms to 
political party affiliations.74 Therefore, a search of a cell phone 
and all of the sensitive information it contains outweighs the 
minimal government interest present.75 
Finally, the government’s argument to extend the 
application of Gant from the context of vehicle-related 
circumstances was rejected by the Court, finding it would have 
“no practical limit at all when it comes to cell phone 
searches.”76 Without discussion, the Court pointed to previous 
cases that laid a foundation of a diminished expectation of 
privacy only in the vehicle context, as well as the more heavily 
weighted government interest in vehicle searches.77 Other 
                                                          
 70. Id. at 2484 (“But while Robinson’s categorical rule strikes the 
appropriate balance in the context of physical objects, neither of its rationales 
has much force with respect to digital content on cell phones.”). 
 71. See id. at 2489. 
 72. Id. Without mentioning United States v. Jones, Justice Roberts points 
out that this decision does not address whether “the collection or inspection of 
aggregated digital information amounts to a search under other 
circumstances.” Id. at 2489 n.1. 
 73. Id. at 2491 (“Indeed, a cell phone search would typically expose to the 
government far more than the most exhaustive search of a house . . . .”). 
 74. Id. at 2490. 
 75. Id. at 2478. 
 76. Id. at 2492. 
 77. Id. (citing Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004); Wyoming v. 
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303–04 (1999)). 
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fallback options were dismissed as well, based on their inability 
to provide clear categorical rules.78 
The facts of Riley indicate the case is about the information 
contained on a cell phone, but the decision was made on data—
the 200-year-old institution has entered the digital frontier. 
Embracing this new terrain does not include looking back and 
seeing that the old way was wrong; instead it means 
acknowledging that some things will need to be handled 
differently moving forward. 
V. WILL SDVS REAP RILEY’S BENEFITS? 
In declining to apply the Robinson rationale to cell phones, 
the Court established that a search of digital content 
constitutes substantial intrusion upon an individual’s privacy, 
creating a different rule for handling digital searches than is 
used for physical searches.79 The ruling suggests a natural 
extension of this protection to other containers of digital data 
by labeling cell phones as “minicomputers.” While the potential 
for its application to automated vehicle technology remains 
uncertain,80 Riley indicates that the interest in protecting the 
personal information disclosed through use of such a vehicle 
would be weighed heavily as well.81 
Like cell phones, autonomous vehicles could contain types 
of digital data that are qualitatively different from physical 
objects and could have the capacity to record that data in 
significant amounts. As mentioned above, the three most 
sensitive types of data would be personally identifiable 
information, route history and planning, and a log of the car’s 
actions. The combination of this information could readily 
confirm the identity of a driver while revealing where she has 
been and is going, as well as provide evidence that a traffic 
violation has occurred. Even just one aspect, though, in a large 
                                                          
 78. Id. at 2491 (dismissing the government’s suggestions of applying an 
analogue test, saying it would create questions of which digital files are 
comparable to physical records; it would also allow a more invasive search 
because it could include items not typically carried in physical form). 
 79. Supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 80. It should be acknowledged that it isn’t clear what that technology will 
even look like. See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text. 
 81. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2492 (“[I]n the vehicle context Gant restricts broad 
searches resulting from minor crimes such as traffic violations.”). The decision 
goes on to discuss cell phone searches to look for evidence of speeding or 
texting while driving. Id. 
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quantity is likely considered an intrusion.82 For example, the 
location information element could be structured in a way to 
show where a person has been in the last twenty-four hours, if 
routes were time stamped and biometrics authentication of 
users were required to operate the vehicle. 
Although it may seem apparent that sensitive digital data 
such as this assuredly deserves protection after reading Riley, 
Gant’s automobile exception to the warrant requirement will 
have some effect on the balance of the equation because of the 
diminished expectation of privacy in vehicles. Even though the 
Court did not extend Gant’s holding that the SITA exception 
includes searches for evidence related to the crime of arrest 
because there would be no practical limit to the search of a cell 
phone, when that same rule is applied solely in the vehicle 
context and to a search of the vehicle itself, it could yield a 
different result. Another decision leaning in the government’s 
favor is Knotts,83 which established that there is no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in a person’s movements “in an 
automobile on public thoroughfares.”84 Even though this rule 
has never been overturned, two concurrences in Jones found 
some types of surveillance to violate a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.85 The concurrences were signed by a total of five 
justices,86 indicating Knotts is susceptible to challenge. 
The Court’s desire to provide law enforcement with clear, 
categorical rules would run into the same difficulties with 
automated vehicle technology that were present in Riley’s 
smartphone if Gant were applied. There would be no practical 
limit to the amount of information accessed and the substantial 
intrusion of privacy would remain the same. However, vehicles 
                                                          
 82. See id. at 2489–91 & n.1 (discussing the privacy consequences arising 
from the quantitative capacity of a cell phone). 
 83. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
 84. Id. at 281. But see Dorothy J. Glancy, Privacy on the Open Road, 30 
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 295, 299 (“But that does not mean that expectations of 
privacy on public roads are worthy of no legal protection at all.”). 
 85. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring); id. at 957 (Alito, Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, JJ., concurring) 
(“[S]ociety’s expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others 
would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly monitor and 
catalogue every single movement of an individual’s car for a very long 
period.”). 
 86. Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, and Justice Kagan joined Justice 
Alito’s concurrence. Id. 
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are highly regulated and there is precedent acknowledging the 
diminished expectation of privacy on the open road.87 Whether 
the government’s interest in gaining incriminating evidence of 
moving violations is significant enough to justify the intrusion 
of privacy is yet to be seen. 
CONCLUSION 
While the road ahead is not perfectly clear, it is 
encouraging that some states are taking the lead on creating a 
regulatory structure for the testing of autonomous vehicles in 
the absence of federal guidelines and that the courts have 
identified digital data as worthy of substantial protection. The 
legislative process must be proactive in addressing the needs 
identified here as manufacturers progress through the levels of 
automation available in consumer vehicles, with states 
producing more thorough codes and Congress establishing the 
Riley digital privacy protections in a way that specifically 
applies to automated vehicle technology. In the meantime, the 
next Supreme Court cases likely to have direct impact on 
autonomous vehicles will be centered on locational privacy 
issues that come from cell site tracking. 
As levels of automation increase to the point where self-
driving vehicles do not necessarily rely on a human operator 
present and where infrastructure development allows these 
vehicles to become interconnected rather than self-contained, 
more questions will be raised. If infrastructure enters the 
equation, expect the availability of real time location 
information to become an even hotter topic and to hear some 
experts discuss the possibility of central control options like 
rerouting vehicles in emergencies or police executing traffic 
stops electronically. 
                                                          
 87. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
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